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From the Bankruptcy Courts
J3.enjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
WHAT IS AN EXECUTORY
CONTRACT? A CHALLENGE TO
THE COUNTRYMAN TEST

The Bankruptcy Code affords the
trustee or the debtor in possession
the power to either reject or assume
executory contracts and unexpired
leases. 1 The rationale underlying this
power is that the trustee or debtor in
possession should be insulated from
contracts that impose burdensome liabilities upon the bankruptcy estate,
but also should be able to take advantage of favorable contracts. 2 The
power to assume or reject executory
contracts is especially important in
reorganization cases where it is used
to relieve the debtor in possession of
unperformed obligations that would
otherwise hamper the debtor's opportunity to make a fresh start.
A question which is often litigated
is: "What is an executory contract?"
In attempting to answer this question, courts often have relied on a
definition formulated by Professor

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub, New York City; member of the
National Bankruptcy Conference.
•• Professor of Law, Hofstra University
S~hool of Law, Hempstead, New York; assoctate member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
1 Bankruptcy Code§ 365. The Bankruptcy
Code is contained in Title II of the United
States Code. See Weintraub & Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual~ 7.10.
2 See Countryman, "Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part 1," 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439,
450 (1973).

Vern Countryman of Harvard Law
School: An executory contract is one
"under which the obligations of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performlillce would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of
the other." 3 Accordingly, if one
party fully performed its part of the,
bargain and there is no further performance required of it, the fact that
the other party did not yet perform
does not render the ' contract
executory within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The Countryman test requiring
performance due on both sides is
based on a functional approach to the
trustee's powers. Similar to the
power to abandon or accept property
of the estate, the option to assume or
reject executory contracts and leases
is to be exercised only when it
benefits the estate. In view of this
purpose of benefiting the estate, it
does not make sense to permit rejection of contracts which were fully
performed on one side, especially
since rejection gives the other party a
claim against the estate for damages
as if the debtor breached. 4 For exam-

3 /d. at 460; see In re Alexander, 6
C.B.C.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982), where the
court of appeals recently applied the Countryman test to determine that an installment land
sale agreement was an executory contract.
4 Bankruptcy Code § 365(g).
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ple, if a creditor fully performed a contract of sale by delivering goods for
which the debtor did not pay, rejection
of the contract by the debtor would be
meaningless in that "the estate has
whatever benefit it can obtain . . . and
. . . rejection would neither add to nor
detract from the creditor's claim or the
estate's liability." 5 Assumption would
also be meaningless as its only effect
would be to give the creditor's claim an
administrative expense priority. 6 On
the other hand, if there was full performance by the debtor prior to bankruptcy, assumption would not improve
upon the debtor's right to performance
by the other party and rejection by the
debtor could not constitute a breach of
a fully performed obligation. Because
assumption or rejection of executory
contracts could actually benefit the estate only if they remain substantially
unperformed on both sides, it is logical
to define "executory contract" in the
Countryman fashion.

Countryman's Promise Rejected
In In re Booth, 7 a recent bankruptcy court decision, however, the
Countryman definition of executory
contract was rejected as the sole test
in reorganization cases. Booth involved the issue of whether a contract
for deed, when the debtor is the
vendee, is an executory contract. In
that case, the sellers made a contract
to sell land to the debtor at a price of
$97,200, with $1,100 down and the
balance to be paid over time. The
sellers were not required to conveytitle until the purchase price was paid
in full and default in the payment of

[VOL. IS : 273 1983]

the price would result in forfeiture of
the purchaser's interest. Upon the
purchaser's filing of a chapter 11 petition, the sellers moved for an order
directing the debtor to either assume
or reject the contract. The debtor demurred, arguing that the installment
contract of sale was not executory
within the meaning of Section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code and that the
sellers' interest should be viewed
only as a lien on the land, thereby
giving them an allowed secured claim
against the estate to the extent of the
unpaid portion of the purchase.price.
At the outset, it is important to appreciate the consequences of classifying this contract as executory and
how the sellers would benefit from
such a determination. If executory,
the debtor would be required to either
affirm the contract by curing defaults
or giving adequate assurance of cure
as well as by complying with contract
by paying future installments when
due, or reject the contract which
would be considered a breach resulting in forfeiture of all payments
which were made. 8 On the other
hand, if the contract was not executory, the debtor would be considered
the owner of the land subject to the
sellers' allowed secured claim9 for
the unpaid balance of the purchase
price which could be dealt with in the
debtor's plan of reorganization. Subject to the Code's requirements for a
confirmation, such as the fair and equitable rule, future installments owed
to the seller could be reduced and extended and the interest rate might in
certain cases be lowered. 10

S Countryman, note 2 supra, at 451.
6See Bankruptcy Code § 503.
719 B.R. 53 (D. Utah 1982) (Mabey, J.).
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8 See

Bankruptcy Code § 365.
9 Bankruptcy Code § 506(a).
lOSee Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)2(A).

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

In rejecting the Countryman standard as the test for determining when
a contract is executory, the Booth
court disagreed with the underlying
premise that either assumption or rejection always benefits the estate
when a contract is substantially unperformed by both parties: :The
Countryman test may often define the
benefit to the estate, but does it always?" 11 The court also disagreed
with Professor Countryman's premise that benefit to the estate is the only
policy underlying the treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy:
"Section 365, however, reflects a
number of policies, including not
only benefit to the estate but also protection of creditors." 12

in possession of real estate the right to
remain and obtain title despite rejection by the debtor of the unperformed
installment sale agreement. Section
365(j) gives similar protection to the
purchaser not in possession by giving
him a lien on the property to secure
repayment of the portion of the price
paid. In essence, although these contracts meet the Countryman test for
executory contracts, the Code
nullifies the effect of such characterization in the interest of benefitting
the nondebtor party.
Thus, Sections 365(i) and 365(j), far
from representing the CountrYman
test, are a tonic for the consequence of
its application. This suggests that in
the final analysis, executory contracts
are measured not by a mutuality of
commitments but by the nature of the
parties and the goals of reorganization.
. . . [l]t is the consequences of applying Section 365 to a party, especially in terms of benefit to the estate
and the protection of creditors, not the
form of contract between vendor and
vendee, which controls. 14

Section 365
As evidence of Congress' concern
for the protection of creditors as
one policy reflected in Section 365,
the court refers to Sections 365(i) and
365(j), which give special treatment
to nondebtor vendees of land sale
contracts, who prior to the Bankruptcy Code were treated often as unsecured creditors of the estate upon
rejection of the contract by the vendor
in bankruptcy. Despite the fact that
the estate of the vendor benefited by
· rejection of the contract in ~at title
would remain in the debtor vendor
while relegating the nondebtor
vendee to the status of an unsecured
creditor, "there was uneasiness over
its result, and some courts moved to
soften its impact." 13 Subsequently,
Section 365(i) of the Code was enacted to give the nondebtor purchaser
ll[n re Booth, note 7 supra, at 55.

Test for Installment Land
Sale Contract
In deciding that an installment land
sale contract is not executory when
the debtor is vendee, despite substantial nonperformance by both parties,
the court focused on three factors:
(1) Enlarging the value of the estate. Treatment of the contract as an
executory contract would result in either forfeiture of the portion of the
price already paid or assumption of
the burdens of the contract as written,
which may be impossible or imprac-

12Jd.
13[d.

l4fd. at 56-57.
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tical in a given case. In comparison,
treatment of the sellers' interest as a
lien to secure payment of the remaining installments would place the sellers on par with other lienors; forfeiture and the loss of equity would
be avoided. "The bankruptcy court,
as a court of equity, regards substance over form, demands equality
of treatment among creditors, and
loathes a forfeiture." 15 By avoiding
forfeiture, the estate is enlarged.
(2) Furthering the rehabilitation
of the debtor. The court noted that
executory contracts should be handled to aid in the rehabilitation of the
debtor.

If the contract is executory, and if it is
assumed during the interim between
petition and plan, defaults must be
cured, damages must be paid, and adequate assurance of performance must
be given, all as costs of administration. If the contract is assumed in a
plan, the same conditions must be
satisfied with the accumulated cost of
administration payable on the effective date of the plan. 16
However, if the contract creates a
lien only, assumption is irrelevant,
administrative costs are avoided, the
debtor's obligation may be dealt with
in the plan, and, if it would assist the
reorganization, property may be sold
free of the lien. Treating the sellers as
lienors "allows more latitude in proposing a plan and thereby furthers the
rehabilitation of the debtor." 17
(3) Adequate protection of creditors. The court analyzed the sellers'
position and found that they had only
i5Jd. at 58.
i6Jd. at 60.
17Jd. at 61.
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two rights under the contract. First,
the right to payment which is not entitled to "adequate protection" because such right is not, in and of itself, a property interest. Section 361
of the Code "protects against any decrease in value of the lien, it does not
guarantee performance of the contract." 18 Second, the sellers have the
right to hold title as security, which is
adequately protected in view of the
nature of the collateral as land. "This
strikes a balance between vendors,
other creditors, and the estate. Vendors are not preferred, for example,
in terms of administrative claims, but
are treated on par with other mortgagees . . . who are protected against
any decrease in the value of their
liens." 19
Before reaching its conclusion, the
court had to dispose of a powerful
argument supporting the sellers' position that the agreement in question is
an executory contract: If installment
land sale agreements are not executory contracts, why did Congress include Sections 365(i) and 3650) in
the Code which specifically recognize that such contracts are executory
when the debtor is vendor? "Put differently, it would be anomalous if
contracts where the debtor sells realty
are executory but contracts where the
debtor buys realty are not." 20 The
court found that this argument was
not persuasive for two reasons. First,
treatment of the contract for deed as
executory when the debtor is vendee,
as in the case at hand, ignores the
18Jd.; see Weintraub & Resnick, note I
supra, ~~ 1.09[5], 8.10, for discussions on

adequate protection requirements.
19Jn re Booth, note 7 supra, at 61.
20Jd. at 62.
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reasons for enacting Sections 365(i)
and 365G). Since they were enacted
to nul1ify the effect of classifying
such agreements as executory by giving the nondebtor vendee the protection of a mortgagee, treating the contract as a lien where the debtor is the
vendee "is cons,istent with the spirit
of these provisions." 21
The second fault with respect to the
sellers' argument based on the presence of Sections 365(i) and 365G)
is that consistency in terminology
(e.g., treating all unperformed contracts for dee.d as executory regardless of whether the debtor is vendor
or vendee) would lead ironically to
disparity in the treatment of similarly
situated nondebtor parties. Whereas
Sections 365(i) and 3650) result in
the treatment of a nondebtor vendee
as a mortgagor and prevents the
debtor from ousting a vendee in
possession of the realty upon rejection of the contract, treatment of a
contract for deed when the debtor is
the vendee as an executory contract
would permit complete rejection and
forfeiture of the debtor vendee's interest. "The upshot is that nondebtor
vendees, by virtue of Sections 365(i)
and 3650), may receive more favorable treatment in bankruptcy than
debtor vendees." 22
Although the court expressed reluctance to depart from a rule as
workable as the Countryman test, it
found that application of the rule in
this case contradicts the reason for its
existence.
Classifying the contract for deed,
where debtor is vendee, as a lien
rather than an executory contract
21Jd.
22Jd. at 63.

benefits the estate by enlarging the
value of the estate and furthering the
rehabilitation of the debtor. Sellers, as
Iienors, enjoy adequate protection.
This is in harmony with the rationale
for Sections 365(i) and 365(j). The
blessings and burdens of reorganization are fairly distributed between creditors and the estate. 23
Conclusion
The ·Countryman test, which has a
sound theoretical basis as well as
practical utility and widespread acceptance, should not be rejected
lightly. The decision that an installment land sale agreement is not an
executory contract despite substantial
nonperformance by both parties is
unjustified, espeically in view of Sections 365(i) and 3650) which evidence congressional intent to regard
such contracts as executory. Clearly,
if such agreements were not executory contracts, there would have been
no reason for including in the Code
Sections 365(i) and 365G).
Nonetheless, the result in Booth
may be justified for a different reason. Despite the fact that the installment land sale agreement is an executory contract, the rejection of it would
result in a forfeiture which might
have an adverse impact on the
debtor's ability to successfully reorganize if the facts would warrant such
a conclusion. It has long been recognized that equity abhors forfeitures. 24
Moreover, assumption of the agree23Jd. at 64.
24 See Ledford v. Atkins, 413 S.W.2d 68
(Ky. 1967); see also Restatement of Contracts
§ 302, which provides: "A condition may be
excused without other reason if its requirement . . . will involve extreme forfeiture or
penalty . . . . "
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ment might have been financially impossible due to the debtor's condition. Thus, in order to avoid the harsh
impact of the forfeiture clause, and
for the policy considerations discussed in the court's opinion, a bankruptcy court might be justified in exercising its equitable powers 25 to treat
the executory contract as a mortgage
25 See Bankruptcy Code § IOS(a); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1481, which provides that "a
bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a
court of equity, Jaw ·and admiralty . . . . "
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to secure the unpaid purchase price.
This treatment would be similar to the
Uniform Commercial Code's treatment of conditional sale agreements
as security interests. 26 This rationale
also fosters flexibility in that it would
reserve for bankruptcy courts in other
cases the power to treat installment
land sale agreements as executory
contracts where their rejection or assumption might be appropriate under
the unique circumstances of the case.
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26See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(2), 1-201(37).

